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CHAPTER III. 

 OF THE THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 



1. LOOKING back now to the commencement of 

 our inquiry, let us attempt to measure how far it has 

 advanced. Logic, we found, is the Theory of Proof. 

 But proof supposes something provable, which must 

 be a Proposition or Assertion ; since nothing but a 

 Proposition can be an object of belief, or therefore 

 of proof. A Proposition is, discourse which affirms 

 or denies something of some other thing. This is one 

 step : there must, it seems, be two things concerned 

 in every act of belief. But what are these Things ? 

 They can be no other than those signified by the two 

 names, which being joined together by a copula con- 

 stitute the Proposition. If, therefore, we knew what 

 all Names signify, we should know everything which 

 is capable either of being made a subject of affirmation 

 or denial, or of being itself affirmed or denied of a 

 subject. We have accordingly, in the preceding 

 chapter, reviewed the various kinds of Names, in 

 order to ascertain what is signified by each of them. 

 And we have now carried this survey far enough to 

 be able to take an account of its results, and to exhibit 

 an enumeration of all the kinds of Things which are 

 capable of being made predicates, or of having any- 

 thing predicated of them : after which to determine 

 the import of Predication, that is, of Propositions, can 

 be no arduous task. 



The necessity of an enumeration of Existences, as 

 the basis of Logic, did not escape the attention of the 

 schoolmen, and of their master, Aristotle, the most 



