68 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



of a universe with nothing in it except sounds, and our- 

 selves hearing them : and what is easily conceived 

 separately, easily obtains a separate name. But in 

 general our names of sensations denote indiscrimi- 

 nately the sensation and the attribute. Thus, colour 

 stands for the sensations of white, red, &c., but also 

 for the quality in the coloured object. We talk of 

 the colours of things as among their properties. 



4. In the case of sensations, another distinction 

 has also to be kept in view, which is often confounded, 

 and never without mischievous consequences. This 

 is, the distinction between the sensation itself, and the 

 state of the bodily organs which precedes the sensa- 

 tion, and which constitutes the physical agency by 

 which it is produced. One of the sources of confu- 

 sion on this subject is the division commonly made of 

 feelings into Bodily and Mental. Philosophically 

 speaking, there is no foundation at all for this distinc- 

 tion : even sensations are states of the sentient mind, 

 not states of the body, as distinguished from it. What 

 I am conscious of when I see the colour blue, is a 

 feeling of blue colour, which is one thing ; the picture 

 on my retina, or the phenomenon of hitherto myste- 

 rious nature which takes place in my optic nerve or 

 in my brain, is another thing, of which I am not at 

 all conscious, and which scientific investigation alone 

 could have apprised me of. These are states of my 

 body ; but the sensation of blue, which is the conse- 

 quence of these states of body, is not a state of body : 

 that which perceives and is conscious is called Mind. 

 When sensations are called bodily feelings, it is only 

 as being the class of feelings which are immediately 

 occasioned by bodily states ; whereas the other kinds 

 of feelings, thoughts, for instance, or emotions, are 



