72 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



together constitute the action. I form the purpose of 

 instantly moving my arm ; that is a state of my 

 mind ; my arm (not being tied nor paralytic) moves 

 in obedience to my purpose ; that is a physical fact, 

 consequent upon a state of mind. The intention, 

 when followed by the fact, or, (if we prefer the ex- 

 pression,) the fact when preceded and caused by the 

 intention, is called the action of moving my arm. 



6. Of the first leading division of nameable 

 things, viz., Feelings or States of Consciousness, we 

 began by recognising three sub-divisions ; Sensations, 

 Thoughts, and Emotions. The first two of these we 

 have illustrated at considerable length ; the third, 

 Emotions, not being perplexed by similar ambiguities, 

 does not require similar exemplification. And, finally, 

 we have found it necessary to add to these three a 

 fourth species, commonly known by the name Voli- 

 tions. Without seeking to prejudge the metaphysical 

 question whether any mental state or phenomenon 

 can be found which is not included in one or other of 

 these four species, it appears to me that the amount 

 of illustration bestowed upon these may, so far as we 

 are concerned, suffice for the whole genus. We shall, 

 therefore, proceed to the two remaining classes of 

 nameable things; all things which are external to 

 the mind being considered as belonging either to the 

 class of Substances or to that of Attributes. 



II. SUBSTANCES. 



Logicians have endeavoured to define Substance 

 and Attribute ; but their definitions are not so much 

 attempts to draw a distinction between the things 

 themselves, as instructions what difference it is custo- 

 mary to make in the grammatical structure of the 



