74 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



on logic. It will scarcely be thought to be a satis- 

 factory one. If an attribute is distinguished from a 

 substance by being the attribute of something, it 

 seems highly necessary to understand what is meant 

 by of: a particle which needs explanation too much 

 itself to be placed in front of the explanation of 

 anything else. And as for the self-existence of sub- 

 stances, it is very true that a substance may be con- 

 ceived to exist without any other substance, but so 

 also may an attribute without any other attribute : 

 and we can no more imagine a substance without 

 attributes than we can imagine attributes without a 

 substance. 



Metaphysicians, however, have probed the ques- 

 tion deeper, and given an account of Substance 

 considerably more satisfactory than this. Substances 

 are usually distinguished as Bodies or Minds. Of 

 each of these, philosophers have at length provided 

 us with a definition which seems unexceptionable. 



7. A Body, according to the received doctrine of 

 modern metaphysicians, may be defined, the external 

 cause to which we ascribe our sensations. When I see 

 and touch a piece of gold, I am conscious of a sensation 

 of yellow colour, and sensations of hardness and weight; 

 and by varying the mode of handling, I may add to 

 these sensations many others completely distinct from 

 them. The sensations are all of which I am directly 

 conscious ; but I consider them as produced by some- 

 thing not only existing independently of my will, but 

 external to my bodily organs and to my mind. This 

 external something I call a Body. 



It may be asked, how come we to ascribe our 

 sensations to any external cause ? and is there suffi- 

 cient ground for so ascribing them? It is known, that 



