THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 75 



there are metaphysicians who have raised a contro- 

 versy on the point ; maintaining the paradox, that we 

 are not warranted in referring our sensations to a 

 cause, such as we understand by the word Body, or to 

 any cause whatever, unless, indeed, the First Cause. 

 Though we have no concern here with this contro- 

 versy, nor with the metaphysical niceties on which it 

 turns, one of the best ways of showing what is meant 

 by Substance is, to consider what position it is neces- 

 sary to take up, in order to maintain its existence 

 against opponents. 



It is certain, then, that a part of our notion of a 

 body consists of the notion of a number of sensations 

 of our own, or of other sentient beings, habitually 

 occurring simultaneously. My conception of the table 

 at which I am writing is compounded of its visible 

 form and size, which are complex sensations of sight ; 

 its tangible form and size, which are complex sensa- 

 tions of our organ of touch and of our muscles ; its 

 weight, which is also a sensation of touch and of the 

 muscles ; its colour, which is a sensation of sight ; its 

 hardness, which is a sensation of the muscles ; its 

 composition, which is another word for all the va- 

 rieties of sensation which we receive under various 

 circumstances from the wood of which it is made ; and 

 so forth. All or most of these various sensations 

 frequently are, and, as we learn by experience, always 

 might be, experienced simultaneously, or in many 

 different orders of succession, at our own choice : and, 

 hence the thought of any one of them makes us think 

 of the others, and the whole become mentally amal- 

 gated into one mixed state of consciousness, which, 

 in the language of the school of Locke and Hartley, is 

 termed a Complex Idea. 



Now there are philosophers who have argued as 



