80 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



the inmost nature of fire or water resemble the 

 impressions made by these objects upon our senses* ? 

 And if not on the principle of resemblance, on what 

 other principle can the manner in which objects affect 

 us through our senses afford us any insight into the 

 inherent nature of those objects ? It may therefore 

 safely be laid down as a truth both obvious in itself, 

 and admitted by all whom it is at present necessary to 

 take into consideration, that, of the outward world, we 



avec un sujet quelconque, et dans ce cas ses proprietes ne seraient 

 encore que relatives: en sorte qu'il me parait fort raisonnable d'ad- 

 mettre que les proprietes determinees des corps n'existent pas 

 independamment d'un sujet quelconque, et que quand on demande 

 si les proprietes de la matiere sont telles que nous les percevons, il 

 faudrait voir auparavant si elles sont en tant que determinees, et 

 dans quel sens il est vrai de dire qu'elles sont." Cours tfHistoire de 

 la Philosophie Morale au I8me siecle, 8me leon. 



* An attempt, indeed, has been made by Reid and others, 

 to establish that although some of the properties we ascribe to 

 objects exist only in our sensations, others exist in the things them- 

 selves, being such as cannot possibly be copies of any impression 

 upon the senses; and they ask, from what sensation our notions of 

 extension and figure have been derived? The gauntlet thrown 

 down by Reid was taken up by Brown, who, applying greater 

 powers of analysis than had previously been applied to the notions 

 of extension and figure, showed clearly what are the sensations from 

 which those notions are derived, viz., sensations of touch, com- 

 bined with sensations of a class previously too little adverted to by 

 metaphysicians, those which have their seat in our muscular frame. 

 Whoever wishes to be more particularly acquainted with this 

 admirable specijnen of. metaphysical analysis, may consult the first 

 volume of Brown's Lectures, or Mill's Analysis of the Mind. 



On this subject also, the authority of M. Cousin may be quoted 

 in favour of conclusions rejected by some of the most eminent 

 thinkers of the school to which he belongs. M. Cousin recognises, 

 in opposition to Reid, the essential subjectivity of our conceptions of 

 the primary qualities of matter, as extension, solidity, &c., equally 

 with those of colour, heat, and the remainder of what are called 

 secondary qualities. Cours, ut supra, 9me le^on. 



