THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 81 



know and can know absolutely nothing, except the 

 sensations which we experience from it. Those, how- 

 ever, who still look upon Ontology as a possible 

 science, and think, not only that bodies have an 

 essential constitution of their own, lying deeper than 

 our perceptions, but that this essence or nature is not 

 altogether inaccessible to human investigation, cannot 

 expect to find their refutation here. The question 

 depends upon the nature and laws of Intuitive Know- 

 ledge, and is not within the province of logic. 



8. Body having now been defined the external 

 cause, and (according to the more reasonable opinion) 

 the hidden external cause, to which we refer our sen- 

 sations ; it remains to frame a definition of Mind. 

 Nor, after the preceding observations, will this be 

 difficult. For, as our conception of a body is that of 

 an unknown exciting cause of sensations, so our con- 

 ception of a mind is that of an unknown recipient, or 

 percipient, of them ; and not of them alone, but of all 

 our other feelings. As body is the mysterious some- 

 thing which excites the mind to feel, so mind is the 

 mysterious something which feels, and thinks. It is 

 unnecessary to give in the case of mind, as we gave 

 in the case of matter, a particular statement of the 

 sceptical system by which its existence as a Thing in 

 itself, distinct from the series of what are denominated 

 its states, is called in question. But it is necessary 

 to remark, that on the inmost nature of the thinking 

 principle, as well as on the inmost nature of matter, 

 we are, and with our human faculties must always 

 remain, entirely in the dark. All which we 

 are aware of, even in our own minds, is (in the 

 words of Mr. Mill) a certain " thread of conscious- 

 ness ;" a series of feelings, that is, of sensations, 



VOL. i. G 



