88 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



Thus in the relation of greater and less between two 

 magnitudes, the fundamentum relationis is the fact that 

 when one of the two magnitudes is applied to the 

 other, it more than covers it ; and cannot, by any new 

 arrangement of parts, be entirely brought within the 

 boundaries of the other object. In the relation of 

 master and servant, the fundamentum relationis is the 

 fact that the one has undertaken, or is compelled, to 

 perform certain services for the benefit, and at the 

 bidding, of the other. In that of husband and wife, 

 the fundamentum relationis consists of the facts 

 that the parties are a man and a woman, that they 

 have promised certain things with certain formali- 

 ties, and are in consequence invested by the law 

 with certain rights, and subjected to certain duties. 

 Examples might be indefinitely multiplied, but it is 

 already obvious that whenever two things are said to 

 be related, there is some fact, or series of facts, into 

 which they both enter ; and that whenever any two 

 things are involved in some one fact, or series of 

 facts, we may ascribe to those two things a mutual 

 relation grounded on the fact. Even if they have 

 nothing in common but what is common to all things, 

 that they are members of the universe, we call that a 

 relation, and denominate them fellow- creatures, fellow- 

 beings, or fellow-denizens of the universe. But in 

 proportion as the fact into which the two objects enter 

 as parts is of a more special and peculiar, or of a more 

 complicated nature, so also is the relation grounded 

 upon it. And there are as many conceivable relations 

 as there are conceivable kinds of fact in which two 

 things can be jointly concerned. 



In the same manner, therefore, as a quality is an 

 attribute grounded upon the fact that a certain sensa- 

 tion or sensations are produced in us by the object, 



