90 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



sunrise, were jointly concerned, consisted only of the 

 two things themselves : no third thing entered into 

 the fact or phenomenon at all ; unless, indeed, we 

 choose to call the succession of the two objects a third 

 thing ; but their succession is not something added to 

 the things themselves ; it is something involved in 

 them. Dawn and sunrise announce themselves to our 

 consciousness by two successive sensations : our con- 

 sciousness of the succession of these sensations is not 

 a third sensation or feeling added to them ; we have 

 not first the two feelings, and then a feeling of their 

 succession. To have two feelings at all, implies having 

 them either successively, or else simultaneously. 

 Sensations, or other feelings, being given, succession 

 and simultaneousness are the two conditions, to the 

 alternative of which they are subjected by the nature 

 of our faculties ; and no one has been able, or needs 

 expect, to analyze the matter any farther. 



11. In a some what similar position are two other 

 sorts of relation. Likeness and Unlikeness. I have 

 two sensations ; we will suppose them to be simple 

 ones ; two sensations of white, or one sensation of 

 white and another of black. I call the first two 

 sensations like; the last two unlike. What is the fact 

 or phenomenon constituting the fundamentum of this 

 relation ? The two s ensations first, and then what we 

 call a feeling of resemblance, or a feeling of want of 

 resemblance. Let us confine ourselves to the former 

 case. Resemblance is evidently a feeling ; a state of 

 the consciousness of the observer. Whether the 

 feeling of the resemblance of the two colours be a 

 third state of consciousness, which I have after having 

 the two sensations of colour, or whether (like the 

 feeling of their succession) it is involved in the sensa- 



