THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 91 



tions themselves, may be a matter of discussion. But 

 in either case, these feelings of resemblance, and of 

 its opposite, dissimilarity, are parts of our nature ; 

 and parts so far from being capable of analysis, that 

 they are pre-supposed in every attempt to analyse any 

 of our other feelings. Likeness and unlikeness, there- 

 fore, as well as antecedence, sequence, and simulta- 

 neousness, must stand apart among relations, as things 

 sui generis. They are attributes grounded on facts, 

 that is, on states of consciousness, but on states 

 which are peculiar, unresolvable, and inexplicable. 



But, although likeness or unlikeness cannot be 

 resolved into anything else, complex cases of likeness 

 or unlikeness can be resolved into simpler ones. 

 When we say of two things which consist of parts, 

 that they are like one another, the likeness of the 

 whole does admit of analysis ; it is compounded of 

 likenesses between the various parts respectively. Of 

 how vast a variety of resemblances of parts must that 

 resemblance be composed, which induces us to say that 

 a portrait, or a landscape, is like its original. If one 

 person mimics another with any success, of how many 

 simple likenesses must the general or complex like- 

 ness be compounded : likeness in a succession of 

 bodily postures ; likeness in voice, or in the accents 

 and intonations of the voice ; likeness in the choice 

 of words, and in the thoughts or sentiments ex- 

 pressed, whether by word, countenance, or gesture. 



All likeness and unlikeness of which we have any 

 cognizance, resolve themselves into likeness and un- 

 likeness between states of our own, or some other, 

 mind. When we say that one body is like another, 

 (since we know nothing of bodies but the sensations 

 which they excite,) we mean really that there is a 

 resemblance between the sensations excited by the 



