92 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



two bodies, or between some portion at least of these 

 sensations. If we say that two attributes are like one 

 another, (since we know nothing of attributes except 

 the sensations or states of feeling on which they are 

 grounded,) we mean really that those sensations, or 

 states of feeling, resemble each other. We may also say 

 that two relations are alike. The fact of resemblance 

 between relations is sometimes called analogy, forming 

 one of the numerous meanings of that word. The 

 relation in which Priam stood to Hector, namely, that 

 of father and son, resembles the relation in which 

 Philip stood to Alexander ; resembles it so closely 

 that they are called the same relation. The relation 

 in which Cromwell stood to England resembles the 

 relation in which Napoleon stood to France, though 

 not so closely as to be called the same relation. The 

 meaning in both these instances must be, that a 

 resemblance existed between the facts which consti- 

 tuted the fundamentum relationis. 



This resemblance may exist in all conceivable 

 gradations, from perfect undistinguishableness to 

 something very slight indeed. When we say, that a 

 thought suggested to the mind of a person of genius 

 is like a seed cast into the ground, because the former 

 produces a multitude of other thoughts, and the latter 

 a multitude of other seeds, this is saying that between 

 the relation of an inventive mind to a thought con- 

 tained in it, and the relation of a fertile soil to a seed 

 contained in it, there exists a resemblance : the real 

 resemblance being in the two fundamenta relationis, in 

 each of which there occurs a germ, producing by its 

 developement a multitude of other things similar to 

 itself. And as, whenever two objects are jointly 

 concerned in a phenomenon, this constitutes a rela- 

 tion between those objects; so, if we suppose a second 



