98 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



resemblance, or succession, or simultaneity, to objects 

 and to attributes, it is always in virtue of resemblance 

 or succession or simultaneity in the sensations or 

 states of consciousness which those objects excite, and 

 on which those attributes are grounded. 



14. In the preceding investigation we have, for 

 the sake of simplicity, considered bodies only, and 

 omitted minds. But what we have said is applicable, 

 mutatis mutandis, to the latter. The attributes of 

 minds, as well as those of bodies, are grounded upon 

 states of feeling or consciousness. But in the case of 

 a mind, we have to consider its own states, as well as 

 those which it produces in other minds. Every attri- 

 bute of a mind consists either in being itself affected 

 in a certain way, or affecting other minds in a certain 

 way. Considered in itself, we can predicate nothing 

 of it, but the series of its own feelings. When we say 

 of any mind, that it is devout, or superstitious, or 

 meditative, or cheerful, we mean that the ideas, 

 emotions, or volitions implied in those words, form a 

 frequently recurring part of the series of feelings, or 

 states of consciousness, which fill up the sentient 

 existence of that mind. 



In addition, however, to those attributes of a mind , 

 which are grounded upon its own states of feeling, 

 attributes may also be ascribed to it, in the same 

 manner as to a body, grounded on the feelings which 

 it excites in other minds. A mind does not, indeed, 

 like a body, excite sensations, but it may excite 

 thoughts or emotions. The most important example 

 of attributes ascribed on this ground is, the employ- 

 ment of terms expressive of approbation or blame. 

 When, for example, we say of any character, or (in 

 other words) of any mind, that it is admirable, we 



