102 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



the Likenesses and Unlikenesses, between feelings or 

 states of consciousness. Those relations, when con- 

 sidered as subsisting between other things, exist in 

 reality only between the states of consciousness which 

 those things, if bodies, excite, if minds, either excite 

 or experience. 



This, until a better can be suggested, must serve 

 us as a substitute for the abortive Classification of 

 Existences^ termed the* Categories :of Aristotle* The 

 practical application of it will appear when we com- 

 mence the inquiry iiite 'we 4tt)pdri o-' Propositions; in 

 other words, when we inquire what it is which the 

 mind actually believes, when it gives what is called its 

 assent to a proposition. 



These four classes comprising, if the classification 

 be correct, all. Nameable Things, these or some of 

 them must of course compose the signification of all 

 names ; and of these or some of them is made up 

 whatever we call a fact, 



For distinction's sake, every fact which is solely 

 composed of feelings or states of consciousness con- 

 sidered as such, is often called a Psychological or 

 Subjective fact ; while every fact which is composed, 

 either wholly or in part, of something different from 

 these, that is, of substances and attributes,, is called 

 an Objective fact. We may say, then, that every 

 objective fact is grounded on a corresponding sub- 

 jective one; and has no meaning to us (apart from the 

 subjective fact which corresponds to it), except as a 

 name for the unknown and inscrutable process by 

 which that subjective or psychological fact is brought 

 to pass. 



