IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS. 121 



the name man, there are some who are also among 

 those denoted by the name copper- coloured. If it be 

 true that all oxen ruminate, it must be true that all the 

 individuals denoted by the name ox are also among 

 those denoted by the name ruminating ; and whoever 

 asserts that all oxen ruminate, undoubtedly does assert 

 that this relation subsists between the two names. 



The assertion, therefore, which, according to 

 Hobbes, is the only one made in any proposition, really 

 is made in every proposition : and his analysis has 

 consequently one of the requisites for being the true 

 one. We may go a step farther ; it is the only 

 analysis that is rigorously true of all propositions 

 without exception. What he gives as the meaning 

 of propositions, is part of the meaning of all propo- 

 sitions, and the whole meaning of some. This, how- 

 ever, only shows what an extremely minute fragment 

 of meaning it is quite possible to include within the 

 logical formula of a proposition. It does not show 

 that no proposition means more. To warrant us in 

 putting together two words with a copula between 

 them, it is really enough that the thing or things 

 denoted by one of the names should be capable, 

 without violation of usage, of being called by the 

 other name also. If then this be all the meaning 

 necessarily implied in the form of discourse called a 

 Proposition, why do I object to it as the scientific 

 definition of what a proposition means ? Because, 

 though the mere collocation which makes the propo- 

 sition a proposition, conveys no more meaning than 

 Hobbes contends for, that same collocation combined 

 with other circumstances, that form combined with 

 other matter y does convey more, and much more. 



The only propositions of which Hobbes' principle 

 is a sufficient account, are that limited and unim- 



