IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS. 133 



5. We have already proceeded far enough not 

 only to demonstrate the error of Hobbes, but to 

 ascertain the real import of by far the most numerous 

 class of propositions. The object of belief in a propo- 

 sition, when it asserts anything more than the meaning 

 of words, is generally, as in the cases which we have 

 examined, either the coexistence or the sequence of 

 two phenomena. At the very commencement of our 

 inquiry, we found that every act of belief implied two 

 Things ; we have now ascertained what, in the most 

 frequent case, these two things are, namely two 

 Phenomena, in other words, two states of conscious- 

 ness ; and what it is which the proposition affirms (or 

 denies) to subsist between them, namely either suc- 

 cession, or coexistence. And this case includes innu- 

 merable instances which no one, previous to reflec- 

 tion, would think of referring to it. Take the following 

 example : A generous person is worthy of honour. 

 Who would expect to recognize here a case of coex- 

 istence between phenomena? But so it is. The 

 attribute which causes a person to be termed generous, 

 is ascribed to him on the ground of states of his mind, 

 and particulars of his conduct : both are phenomena ; 

 the former are facts of internal consciousness, the 

 latter, so far as distinct from the former, are physical 

 facts, or perceptions of the senses. Worthy of honour, 

 admits of a similar analysis. Honour, as here used, 

 means a state of approving and admiring emotion, 

 followed upon occasion by corresponding outward 

 acts. "Worthy of honour" connotes all this, together 

 with our approval of the act of showing honour. All 

 these are phenomena ; states of internal consciousness, 

 accompanied or followed by physical facts. When 

 we say, A generous person is worthy of honour, we 

 affirm coexistence between the two complicated phe- 



