136 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



the objects themselves, could be assigned. In addi- 

 tion to propositions which assert a sequence or coex- 

 istence between two phenomena, there are therefore, 

 also, propositions which assert resemblance between 

 them : as, This colour is like that colour ; The heat 

 of to-day is equal to the heat of yesterday. It is true 

 that such an assertion might with some plausibility be 

 brought within the description of an affirmation of 

 sequence, by considering it as an assertion that the 

 simultaneous contemplation of the two colours is 

 followed by a specific feeling termed the feeling of 

 resemblance. But there would be nothing gained by 

 encumbering ourselves, especially in this place, with 

 a generalization which may be looked upon as strained. 

 Logic does not undertake to analyze things into their 

 ultimate elements. Resemblance between two pheno- 

 mena is more intelligible in itself than any explanation 

 could make it, and under any classification must 

 remain specifically distinct from the ordinary cases of 

 sequence and coexistence. 



It is sometimes said that all propositions what- 

 ever, of which the predicate is a general name, do, in 

 point of fact, affirm or deny resemblance. All such 

 propositions affirm that a thing belongs to a class ; 

 but things being classed together according to their 

 resemblance, everything is of course classed with the 

 things which it resembles most ; and thence, it may 

 be said, when we affirm that gold is a metal, or that 

 Socrates is a man, the affirmation intended is, that 

 gold resembles other metals, and Socrates other men, 

 more nearly than they resemble the objects contained 

 in any other of the classes co-ordinate with these. 



There is some slight degree of foundation for 

 this remark, but no more than a slight degree. The 

 arrangement of things into classes, such as the class 



