140 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



those in which the terms are abstract. The distinc- 

 tion between an abstract term and its corresponding 

 concrete, is no difference in what they are appointed 

 to signify; for the real signification of a concrete 

 general name is, as we have so often said, its con- 

 notation ; and what the concrete term connotes, forms 

 the entire meaning of the abstract name. Since there 

 is nothing in the import of an abstract name which 

 is not in the import of the corresponding concrete, it 

 is natural to suppose that neither can there be any- 

 thing in the import of a proposition of which the 

 terms are abstract, but what there is in some proposi- 

 tion which can be framed of concrete terms. 



And this presumption a closer examination will 

 confirm. An abstract name is the name of an attri- 

 bute, or combination of attributes. The correspond- 

 ing concrete is a name given to things, because of, 

 and in order to express, their possessing that attribute, 

 or that combination of attributes. When, therefore, 

 we predicate of anything a concrete name, the attribute 

 is what we in reality predicate of it. But it has now 

 been shown that in all propositions of which the pre- 

 dicate is a concrete name, what is really predicated is 

 one of five things : Existence, Coexistence, Causation, 

 Sequence, or Resemblance. An attribute,, therefore, 

 is necessarily either an existence, a coexistence, a 

 causation, a sequence, or a resemblance. When a 

 proposition consists of a subject and predicate which 

 are abstract terms, it consists of terms which must 

 necessarily signify one or other of these things. When 

 we predicate of any thing an abstract name, we affirm 

 of the thing that it is one or other of these five things ; 

 that it is a case of Existence, or of Coexistence, or of 

 Causation, or of Sequence, or of Resemblance. 



It is impossible to imagine any proposition ex- 



