IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS. 141 



pressed in abstract terms, which cannot be trans- 

 formed into a precisely equivalent proposition in which 

 the terms are concrete, namely, either the concrete 

 names which connote the attributes themselves, or 

 the names of the fundamenta of those attributes, the 

 facts or phenomena on which they are grounded. To 

 illustrate the latter case, let us take this proposition, 

 of which only the subject is an abstract name, 

 " Thoughtlessness is dangerous." Thoughtlessness 

 is an attribute grounded on the facts which we call 

 thoughtless actions ; and the proposition is equivalent 

 to this, Thoughtless actions are dangerous. In the 

 next example the predicate as well as the subject are 

 abstract names: " Whiteness is a colour;" or " The 

 colour of snow is a whiteness." These attributes 

 being grounded upon sensations, the equivalent pro- 

 positions in the concrete would be, The sensation of 

 white is one of the sensations called those of colour, 

 The sensation of sight, caused by looking at snow, is 

 one of the sensations called sensations of white. In 

 these propositions, as we have before seen, the matter- 

 of-fact asserted is a Resemblance. In the following 

 examples, the concrete terms are those which directly 

 correspond to the abstract names ; connoting the at- 

 tribute which these denote. "Prudence is a virtue:" 

 this may be rendered, " All prudent persons, in so 

 far as prudent, are virtuous :" " Courage is deserving 

 of honour" thus, "All courageous persons are de- 

 serving of honour so far forth as they are courageous ;" 

 which is equivalent to this "All courageous persons 

 deserve an addition to the honour, or a diminution 

 of the disgrace, which would attach to them on other 

 grounds." 



In order to throw still further light upon the 

 import of propositions of which the terms are abstract, 



