142 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



we will subject one of the examples given above to a 

 minuter analysis. The proposition we shall select is 

 the following : " Prudence is a virtue." Let us sub- 

 stitute for the word virtue an equivalent but more defi- 

 nite expression, such as "a mental quality beneficial to 

 society," or "a mental quality pleasing to God," or 

 whichever other of the definitions of virtue we prefer. 

 What the proposition asserts is a sequence, accompa- 

 nied with causation, namely, that benefit to society, 

 or that the approval of God, is consequent upon, 

 and caused by, prudence. Here is a sequence ; but 

 between what? We understand the consequent of 

 the sequence, but we have yet to analyze the ante- 

 cedent. Prudence is an attribute ; and, in connexion 

 with it, two things besides itself are to be considered ; 

 prudent persons, who are the subjects of the attribute, 

 and prudential conduct, which may be called the foun- 

 dation of it. Now is either of these the antecedent ? 

 and, first, is it meant, that the approval of God, or 

 benefit to society, is attendant upon all prudent persons? 

 No ; except in so far forth as they are prudent ; for 

 prudent persons who are scoundrels can seldom on the 

 whole be beneficial to society, nor acceptable to even 

 finite wisdom. Is it upon prudential conduct, then, 

 that divine approbation and benefit to mankind are 

 invariably consequent ? Neither is this the assertion 

 meant when it is said that prudence is a virtue ; 

 except with the same reservation as before, and for 

 the same reason, namely, that prudential conduct, 

 although in so far as it is prudential it is beneficial 

 to society, may yet, by reason of some other of its 

 qualities, be productive of an injury outweighing the 

 benefit, and of a divine displeasure exceeding the 

 approbation which would be due to the prudence. 

 Neither the substance, therefore (viz., the person), 



