IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS. 143 



nor the phenomenon (the conduct), is an antece- 

 dent upon which the other term of the sequence is 

 universally consequent. But the proposition, " Pru- 

 dence is a virtue," is an universal proposition. What 

 is it, then, upon which the proposition affirms the 

 effects in question to be universally consequent? 

 Upon that in the person, and in the conduct, which 

 causes them to be called prudent, and which is equally 

 in them when the action, though prudent, is wicked ; 

 namely, a correct foresight of consequences, a just esti- 

 mation of their importance to the object in view, and 

 repression of any unreflecting impulse at variance with 

 the deliberate purpose. These, which are states of the 

 person's mind, are the real antecedent in the sequence, 

 the real cause in the causation, which are asserted by 

 the proposition. But these are also the real ground, 

 or foundation, of the attribute Prudence ; since where - 

 ever these states of mind exist we may predicate 

 prudence, even before we know whether any conduct 

 has followed. And in this manner every assertion re- 

 specting an attribute may be transformed into an 

 assertion exactly equivalent respecting the fact or 

 phenomenon which is the ground of the attribute. 

 And no case can be assigned, where that which is 

 predicated of the fact or phenomenon, does not belong 

 to one or other of the five species formerly enume- 

 rated : it is either simple Existence, or it is some 

 Sequence, Coexistence, Causation, or Resemblance. 



And as these five are the only things which can 

 be affirmed, so are they the only things which can be 

 denied. " No horses are web-footed " denies that 

 the attributes of a horse ever coexist with web-feet. 

 It is scarcely necessary to apply the same analysis to 

 Particular affirmations and negations. " Some birds 

 are web-footed," affirms that, with the attributes 



