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CHAPTER VI. 

 OF PROPOSITIONS MERELY VERBAL. 



1. As a preparation for the inquiry which is 

 the proper object of Logic, namely, in what manner 

 propositions are to be proved, we have found it neces- 

 sary to inquire what they contain which requires, or is 

 susceptible of, proof; or (which is the same thing) 

 what they assert. In the course of this preliminary 

 investigation into the import of Propositions, we 

 examined the opinion of the Conceptualists, that a 

 proposition is the expression of a relation between 

 two ideas ; and the doctrine of the Nominalists, that it 

 is the expression of an agreement or disagreement 

 between the meanings of two names. We decided 

 that, as general theories, both of these are erroneous ; 

 and that, although propositions may be made both 

 respecting names and respecting ideas, neither the 

 one nor the other are the subject-matter of Proposi- 

 tions considered generally. We then examined the 

 different kinds of propositions, and we found that, 

 with the exception of those which are merely verbal, 

 they assert five different kinds of matters of fact, 

 namely, Existence, Order in Place, Order in Time, 

 Causation, and Resemblance; that in every propo- 

 sition one of these five is either affirmed, or denied, of 

 some fact or phenomenon, or of some object the 

 unknown source of a fact or phenomenon. 



In distinguishing, however, the different kinds of 

 matters of fact asserted in propositions, we reserved 

 one class of propositions, which do not relate to any 



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