VERBAL AND REAL PROPOSITIONS. 151 



but several attributes of the object, each of which 

 attributes separately forms also the bond of union 

 of some class, and the meaning of some general 

 name ; we may predicate of a name which connotes a 

 variety of attributes, another name which connotes 

 only one of these attributes, or some smaller number 

 of them than all. In such cases, the universal 

 affirmative proposition will be true ; since whatever 

 possesses the whole of any set of attributes, must 

 possess any part of that same set. A proposition of 

 this sort, however, conveys no information to any one 

 who previously understood the whole meaning of the 

 terms. The propositions, Every man is a corporeal 

 being, Every man is a living creature, Every man is 

 rational, convey no knowledge to any one who was 

 already aware of the entire meaning of the word man, 

 for the meaning of the word includes all this: and, 

 that every man has the attributes connoted by all these 

 predicates, is already asserted when he is called a 

 man. Now, of this nature are all the propositions 

 which have been called essential ; they are, in fact, 

 identical propositions. 



It is true that a proposition which predicates any 

 attribute, even though it be one implied in the name, 

 is in most cases understood to involve a tacit assertion 

 that there exists a thing corresponding to the name, 

 and possessing the attributes connoted by it; and this 

 implied assertion may convey information, even to 

 those who understood the meaning of the name. But 

 all information of this sort, conveyed by all the 

 essential propositions of which man can be made the 

 subject, is included in the assertion, Men exist. And 

 this assumption of real existence is after all only the 

 result of an imperfection of language. It arises from 

 the ambiguity of the copula, which, in addition to 



