CLASSIFICATION AND THE PREDICABLES. 167 



greater number, but a number inexhaustible by us, 

 and to which as we know no bounds, they may, so 

 far as we are concerned, be regarded as infinite. 



There is no impropriety in saying that of these 

 two classifications, the one answers to a much more 

 radical distinction in the things themselves, than the 

 other does. And if any one even chooses to say that 

 the one classification is made by nature, the other by 

 us for our convenience, he will be right; provided he 

 means no more than this, that where a certain appa- 

 rent difference between things (although perhaps in 

 itself of little moment) answers to we know not what 

 number of other differences, pervading not only their 

 known properties but properties yet undiscovered, it 

 is not optional but imperative to recognise this differ- 

 ence as the foundation of a specific distinction : while, 

 on the contrary, differences that are merely finite and 

 determinate, like those designated by the words white, 

 black, or red, may be disregarded if the purpose for 

 which the classification is made does not require 

 attention to those particular properties. The differ- 

 ences, however, are made by nature, in both cases ; 

 while the recognition of those differences as^ grounds 

 of classification and of naming, is; equally in both 

 cases, the act of man : only in the one case, the ends 

 of language and of classification would be subverted if 

 no notice were taken of the difference, while in the 

 other case, the necessity of taking notice of it depends 

 upon the importance or unimportance of the parti- 

 cular qualities in which the difference happens to 

 consist. 



Now, these classes, distinguished by unknown 

 multitudes of properties, and not solely by a few 

 determinate ones, are the only classes which, by the 



