170 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



that is, if their differences are inexhaustible, and not 

 referrible to any common cause, they are different 

 species, whether they are both descended from Noah 

 or not. But if their differences can all be traced to 

 climate and habits, they are not, in the logician's 

 view, specifically distinct. 



When the infima species, or proximate Kind, to 

 which an individual belongs, has been ascertained., 

 the properties common to that Kind include necessa- 

 rily the whole of the common properties of every 

 other real Kind to which the individual can be refer- 

 rible. Let the individual, for example, be Socrates, 

 and the proximate Kind, man. Animal, or living 

 creature, is also a real Kind, and includes Socrates ; 

 but since it likewise includes man, or in other words, 

 since all men are animals, the properties common to 

 animals form a portion of the common properties of 

 the sub-class, man : and if there be any class which 

 includes Socrates without including man, that class is 

 not a real Kind. Let the class, for example, be fiat- 

 nosed; that being a class which includes Socrates, 

 without including all men. To determine whether it 

 is a real Kind, we must ask ourselves this question : 

 Have all flat-nosed animals, in addition to whatever is 

 implied in their flat noses, any common properties, 

 other than those which are common to all animals 

 whatever ? If they had ; if a flat nose were a mark or 

 index to an indefinite number of other peculiarities, 

 not deducible from the former by any ascertainable 

 law; then out of the class man we might cut another 

 class, flat-nosed man, which, according to our defini- 

 tion, would be a Kind. But if we could do this, man 

 would not be, as it was assumed to be, the proximate 

 Kind. Therefore the properties of the proximate Kind 

 do comprehend those (whether known or unknown) 



