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CHAPTER VIII. 

 OF DEFINITION. 



1. ONE necessary part of the theory of Names 

 and of Propositions remains to be treated of in this 

 place ; the theory of Definitions. As being the most 

 important of the class of propositions which we have 

 characterised as purely verbal, they have already 

 received some notice in the chapter preceding the 

 last. But their fuller treatment was at that time 

 postponed, because definition is so closely connected 

 with classification, that, until the nature of the latter 

 process is in some measure understood, the former 

 cannot be discussed to much purpose. 



2. The simplest and most correct notion of a 

 Definition is, a proposition declaratory of the meaning 

 of a word ; namely, either the meaning which it 

 bears in common acceptation, or that which the 

 speaker or writer, for the particular purposes of his 

 discourse, intends to annex to it. 



The definition of a word being the proposition 

 which enunciates its meaning, words which have no 

 meaning are unsusceptible of definition. Proper 

 names, therefore, cannot be defined. A proper name 

 being a mere mark put upon an individual, and of 

 which it is the characteristic property to be destitute 

 of meaning, its meaning cannot of course be declared ; 

 though we may indicate by language, as we might 

 indicate still more conveniently by pointing with the 

 finger, upon what individual that particular mark has 

 been, or is intended to be, put. It is no definition of 



