184 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



up among them the whole connotation of the name to 

 be defined. In this last case, again, we may either 

 compose our definition of as many connotative names 

 as there are attributes, each attribute being connoted 

 by one; as, Man is a corporeal, organised, animated, 

 rational being, shaped so and so ; or we may employ 

 names which connote several of the attributes at once, 

 as, Man is a rational animal, shaped so and so. 



The definition of a name, according to this view of 

 it, is the sum total of all the essential propositions 

 which can be framed with that name for their subject. 

 All propositions the truth of which is implied in the 

 name, all those which we are made aware of by merely 

 hearing the name, are included in the definition if 

 complete, and may be evolved from it without the aid 

 of any other premisses ; whether the definition ex- 

 presses them in two or three words, or in a larger 

 number. It is, therefore, not without reason that 

 Condillac and other writers have affirmed a definition 

 to be an analysis. To resolve any complex whole 

 into the elements of which it is compounded, is the 

 meaning of analysis ; and this we do when we replace 

 one word which connotes a set of attributes collec- 

 tively, by two or more which connote the same attri- 

 butes singly, or in smaller groups. 



3. From this, however, the question naturally 

 arises, in what manner are we to define a name which 

 connotes only a single attribute? for instance, "white," 

 which connotes nothing but whiteness; "rational," 

 which connotes nothing but the possession of reason. 

 It might seem that the meaning of such names could 

 only be declared in two ways; by a synonymous term, 

 if any such can be found ; or in the direct way already 

 alluded to : " White is a name connoting the attribute 



