DEFINITION. 201 



are true : there is no possibility of controverting 

 them. Therefore, the premisses considered as parts of 

 a definition cannot be the real ones. The real pre- 

 misses must be : 



A dragon is a really existing thing which breathes 

 flame : 



A dragon is a really existing serpent: 

 which implied premisses being false, the falsity of the 

 conclusion presents no absurdity. If we would 

 determine what conclusion follows from the same 

 ostensible premisses when the tacit assumption of real 

 existence is left out, let us, according to the recom- 

 mendation in the Westminster Review, substitute means 

 for is. We then have : 



A dragon is a word meaning a thing which breathes 

 flame : 



A dragon is a word meaning a serpent : 

 From which the conclusion is, 



Some word or words which mean a serpent, also 



mean a thing which breathes flame : 

 where the conclusion (as well as the premisses) is 

 true, and is the only kind of conclusion which can 

 ever follow from a definition, namely, a proposition 

 relating to the meaning of words. If it relate to 

 anything else, we may know that it does not follow 

 from the definition, but from the tacit assumption of 

 a matter of fact. 



It is only necessary further to inquire, in what 

 cases that tacit assumption is really made, and in 

 what cases not. Unless we declare the contrary, we 

 always convey the impression that we intend to make 

 the assumption, when we profess to define any name 

 which is already known to be a name of really existing 

 objects. On this account it is, that the assumption 

 was not necessarily implied in the definition of a 



