210 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



Whenever the inquiry into the definition of the 

 name of any real object consists of anything else than 

 a mere comparison of authorities, we tacitly assume 

 that a meaning must be found for the name, compa- 

 tible with its continuing to denote, if possible all, but 

 at any rate the greater or the more important part, 

 of the things of which it is commonly predicated. 

 The inquiry, therefore, into the definition, is an 

 inquiry into the resemblances and differences among 

 those things : whether there be any resemblance 

 running through them all ; if not, through what 

 portion of them such a general resemblance can be 

 traced : and finally, what are the common attributes, 

 the possession of which gives to them all, or to that 

 portion of them, the character of resemblance which 

 has led to their being classed together. When these 

 common attributes have been ascertained and speci- 

 fied, the name which belongs in common to the 

 resembling objects, acquires a distinct instead of a 

 vague connotation ; and by possessing this distinct 

 connotation, becomes susceptible of definition. 



In giving a distinct connotation to the general 

 name, the philosopher will endeavour to fix upon such 

 attributes as, while they are common to all the things 

 usually denoted by the name, are also of greatest 

 importance in themselves, either directly, or from 

 the number, the conspicuousness, or the interesting 

 character, of the consequences to which they lead. 

 He will select, as far as possible, such differentia as 

 lead to the greatest number of interesting propria. 

 For these, rather than the more obscure and recondite 



after him, evinces his own superior wisdom by pausing on its 

 brink, and giving up as desperate his proper business of bridging it 

 over." 



