INFERENCE IN GENERAL. 217 



position from a previous proposition or propositions ; 

 to give credence to it, or claim credence for it, as a 

 conclusion from something else ; is to reason, in the 

 most extensive sense of the term. There is a narrower 

 sense, in which the name reasoning is confined to the 

 form of inference which is termed ratiocination, and 

 of which the syllogism is the general type. The 

 reasons for not conforming to this restricted use of 

 the term were stated in an early stage of our inquiry, 

 and additional motives will be suggested by the con- 

 siderations on which we are now about to enter. 



2. In proceeding to take into consideration the 

 cases in which inferences can legitimately be drawn, 

 we shall first mention some cases in which the infe- 

 rence is apparent, not real ; and which require notice 

 chiefly that they may not be confounded with cases of 

 inference properly so called. This occurs when the 

 proposition ostensibly inferred from another, appears 

 on analysis to be merely a repetition of the same, or 

 part of the same, assertion, which was contained in 

 the first* All the cases mentioned in books of Logic, 

 as examples of ^Equipollency or equivalence of pro- 

 positions, are of this nature. Thus, if we were to 

 argue, No man is incapable of reason, for every man 

 is rational ; or, All men are mortal, for no man is 

 exempt from death ; it would be plain that we were not 

 proving the proposition, but only appealing to another 

 mode of wording it, which may or may not be more 

 readily comprehensible by the hearer, or better adapted 

 to suggest the real proof, but which contains in itself 

 no shadow of proof. 



Another case is where, from an universal proposi- 

 tion, we affect to infer another which differs from it 

 only in being particular : as, All A is B, therefore 



