INFERENCE IN GENERAL. 223 



out from known truths, to arrive at others really 

 distinct from them. 



Reasoning, in the extended sense in which I use 

 the term, and in which it is synonymous with 

 Inference, is popularly said to be of two kinds: 

 reasoning from particulars to generals, and reason- 

 ing from generals to particulars ; the former being 

 called Induction, the latter Ratiocination or Syllogism. 

 It will presently be shown that there is a third species 

 of reasoning, which falls under neither of these 

 descriptions, and which, nevertheless, is not only 

 valid, but the foundation of both the others. 



It is necessary to observe, that the expressions, 

 reasoning from particulars to generals, and reasoning 

 from generals to particulars, are recommended by 

 brevity rather than by precision, and do not ade- 

 quately mark, without the aid of a commentary, the 

 distinction between Induction and Ratiocination. The 

 meaning intended by these expressions is, that Induc- 

 tion is inferring a proposition from propositions less 

 general than itself, and Ratiocination is inferring a 

 proposition from propositions equally or more general. 

 When, from the observation of a number of individual 

 instances, we ascend to a general proposition, or when, 

 by combining a number of general propositions, we 

 conclude from them another proposition still more 

 general, the process, which is substantially the same 

 in both instances, is called Induction. When from a 

 general proposition, not alone (for from a single 

 proposition nothing can be concluded which is not 

 involved in the terms,) but by combining it with other 

 propositions, we infer a proposition of the same degree 

 of generality with itself, or a less general proposition, 

 or a' proposition merely individual, the process is 

 Ratiocination. When, in short, the conclusion is 



