238 REASONING. 



was or could be originally got at by any conceivable 

 manipulation of mere names ; and that what can be 

 learnt from names, is only what somebody who used 

 the names, knew before ? Philosophical analysis con- 

 firms the indication of common sense., that the function 

 of names is but that of enabling us to remember and to 

 communicate our thoughts. That they also strengthen, 

 even to an incalculable extent, the power of thought 

 itself, is most true : but they do this by no intrinsic 

 and peculiar virtue ; they do it by the power inherent 

 in an artificial memory, an instrument of which few 

 have adequately considered the immense potency. 

 As an artificial memory, language truly is, what it 

 has so often been called, an instrument of thought : 

 but it is one thing to be the instrument, and another 

 to be the exclusive subject upon which the instrument 

 is exercised. We think, indeed, to a considerable 

 extent, by means of names, but what we think of, are 

 the things called by those names ; and there cannot 

 be a greater error 'than to imagine that thought can 

 be carried on with nothing in our mind but names, 

 or that we can make the names think for us. 



3. Those who considered the dictum de omni as 

 the foundation of the syllogism, looked upon argu- 

 ments in a manner corresponding to the erroneous 

 view which Hobbes took of propositions. Because 

 there are some propositions which are merely verbal, 

 Hobbes, in order (apparently) that his definition 

 might be rigorously universal, defined a proposition 

 as if no propositions declared anything except the 

 meaning of words. If Hobbes was right ; if no 

 further account than this could be given of the import 

 of propositions; no theory could be given but the 



