FUNCTIONS AND VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM. 251 



and there may be a resting place at the top of the hill, 

 affording a commanding view of the surrounding 

 country ; but for the mere purpose of arriving at 

 our journey's end, our taking that road is perfectly 

 optional; it is a question of time, trouble, and 

 danger. 



Not only may we reason from particulars to par- 

 ticulars, without passing through generals, but we 

 perpetually do so reason. All our earliest inferences 

 are of this nature. From the first dawn of intelligence 

 we draw inferences, but years elapse before we learn 

 the use of general language. The child, who, having 

 burnt his fingers, avoids to thrust them again into the 

 fire, has reasoned or inferred, though he has never 

 thought of the general maxim, Fire burns. He knows 

 from memory that he has been burnt, and on this 

 evidence believes, when he sees a candle, that if he 

 puts his finger into the flame of it, he will be burnt 

 again. He believes this in every case which happens 

 to arise ; but without looking, in each instance, beyond 

 the present case. He is not generalizing ; he is infer- 

 ring a particular from particulars. In the same way, 

 also, brutes reason. There is little or no ground for 

 attributing to any of the lower animals the use of con- 

 ventional signs, without which general propositions 

 are impossible. But those animals profit by experi- 

 ence, and avoid what they have found to cause them 

 pain, in the same manner, though not always with the 

 same skill, as a human creature. Not only the burnt 

 child, but the burnt dog, dreads the fire. 



I believe that, in point of fact, when drawing 

 inferences from our personal experience, and not from 

 maxims handed down to us by books or tradition, we 

 much oftener conclude from particulars to particulars 

 directly, than through the intermediate agency of any 



