252 REASONING. 



general proposition. We are constantly reasoning 

 from ourselves to other people, or from one person to 

 another, without giving ourselves the trouble to erect 

 our observations into general maxims of human or 

 external nature. When we conclude that some person 

 will, on some given occasion, feel or act so and so, 

 we sometimes judge from an enlarged consideration of 

 the manner in which men in general, or men of some 

 particular character, are accustomed to feel and act; 

 but much oftener from having known the feelings and 

 conduct of the same man in some previous instance, 

 or from considering how we should feel or act our- 

 selves. It is not only the village matron who, when 

 called to a consultation upon the case of a neighbour's 

 child, pronounces on the evil and its remedy simply 

 on the recollection and authority of what she accounts 

 the similar case of her Lucy. We all, where we have 

 no definite maxims to steer by, guide ourselves in the 

 same way ; and if we have an extensive experience, 

 and retain its impressions strongly, we may acquire in 

 this manner a very considerable power of accurate 

 judgment, which we may be utterly incapable of 

 justifying or of communicating to others. Among 

 the higher order of practical intellects, there have been 

 many of whom it was remarked how admirably they 

 suited their means to their ends, without being able 

 to give any sufficient reasons for what they did ; and 

 applied, or seemed to apply, recondite principles which 

 they were wholly unable to state. This is a natural 

 consequence of having a mind stored with appro- 

 priate particulars, and having been long accustomed 

 to reason at once from these to fresh particulars, 

 without practising the habit of stating to oneself or 

 to others the corresponding general propositions. An 

 old warrior, on a rapid glance at the outlines of the 



