264 REASONING. 



record of that act ; but the syllogistic form is an 

 indispensable collateral security for the correctness of 

 the generalisation itself. 



It has already been seen, that if we have a collec- 

 tion of particulars sufficient for grounding an induc- 

 tion, we need not frame a general proposition ; we 

 may reason at once from those particulars to other 

 particulars. But it is to be remarked withal, that 

 whenever, from a set of particular cases, we can 

 legitimately draw any inference, we may legitimately 

 make our inference a general one. If, from observa- 

 tion and experiment, we can conclude to one new 

 case, so may we to an indefinite number. If that 

 which has held true in our past experience will 

 therefore hold in time to come, it will hold not 

 merely in some individual case, but in all cases of a 

 given description. Every induction, therefore, which 

 suffices to prove one fact, proves an indefinite multi- 

 tude of facts : the experience which justifies a single 

 prediction must be such as will suffice to bear out a 

 general theorem. This theorem it is extremely 

 important to ascertain and declare, in its broadest 

 form of generality; and thus to place before our 

 minds, in its full extent, the whole of what our 

 evidence must prove if it proves anything. 



This throwing of the whole body of possible 

 inferences from a given set of particulars, into one 

 general expression, operates as a security for their 

 being just inferences in more ways than one. First, 

 the general principle presents a larger object to the 

 imagination than any of the singular propositions 

 which it contains. A process of thought which leads 

 to a comprehensive generality, is felt as of greater 

 importance than one which terminates in an insulated 

 fact ; and the mind is, even unconsciously, led to 



