280 REASONING. 



inference, between the particulars observed, and those 

 to which we apply the observation. If we had suffi- 

 ciently capacious memories, and a sufficient power of 

 maintaining order among a huge mass of details, the 

 reasoning could go on without any general propositions ; 

 they are mere formulae for inferring particulars from 

 particulars. The principle of general reasoning is, (as 

 before explained,) that if from observation of certain 

 known particulars, what was seen to be true of them 

 can be inferred to be true of any others, it may be 

 inferred of all others which are of a certain descrip- 

 tion. And in order that we may never fail to draw 

 this conclusion in a new case when it can be drawn 

 correctly, and may avoid drawing it when it cannot, 

 we determine once for all what are the distinguishing 

 marks by which such cases may be recognised. The 

 subsequent process is merely that of identifying an 

 object, and ascertaining it to have those marks ; 

 whether we identify it by the very marks themselves, 

 or by others which we have ascertained (through 

 another and a similar process) to be marks of those 

 marks. The real inference is always from particulars 

 to particulars, from the observed instances to an 

 unobserved one : but in drawing this inference, we 

 conform to a formula which we have adopted for our 

 guidance in such operations, and which is a record of 

 the criteria by which we thought we had ascertained 

 that we might distinguish when the inference could 

 and when it could not be drawn. The real premisses 

 are the individual observations, even though they may 

 have been forgotten, or, being the observations of 

 others and not of ourselves, may, to us, never have 

 been known : but we have before us proof that we or 

 others once thought them sufficient for an induction, 

 and we have marks to show whether any new case is 



