342 REASONING. 



the conclusion, does not conform to the above 

 axiom. 



Without attaching exaggerated importance to the 

 distinction now drawn, I think it enables us to charac- 

 terise in a more accurate manner than is usually done, 

 the nature of demonstrative evidence and of logical 

 necessity. That is necessary, from which to withhold 

 our assent would be to violate the above axiom. And 

 since the axiom can only be violated by assenting to 

 premisses and rejecting a legitimate conclusion from 

 them, nothing is necessary except the connexion 

 between a conclusion and premisses ; of which doc- 

 trine, the whole of this and the preceding chapter are 

 submitted as the proof. 



We have now proceeded as far in the theory 

 of Deduction as we can advance in the present stage 

 of our inquiry. Any further insight into the subject 

 requires that the foundation shall have been laid of 

 the philosophic theory of Induction itself; in which 

 theory that of deduction, as a mode of induction, 

 which we have now shown it to be, will assume 

 spontaneously the place which belongs to it, and will 

 receive its share of whatever light may be thrown 

 upon the great intellectual operation of which it forms 

 so important a part. 



We here, therefore, close the Second Book. The 

 theory of Induction, in the most comprehensive sense 

 of the term, will form the subject of the Third. 



