360 INDUCTION. 



Mr. Whewell maintains that the general propo- 

 sition which binds together the particular facts and 

 makes them, as it were, one fact, is not the mere 

 sum of those facts, but something more, since 

 there is introduced a conception of the mind, which 

 did not exist in the facts themselves. "The par- 

 ticular facts," says he*, " are not merely brought 

 together, but there is a new element added to 

 the combination by the very act of thought by 

 which they are combined. . . When the Greeks, 

 after long observing the motions of the planets, saw 

 that these motions might be rightly considered as 

 produced by the motion of one wheel revolving in 

 the inside of another wheel, these wheels were crea- 

 tions of their minds, added to the facts which they 

 perceived by sense. And even if the wheels were no 

 longer supposed to be material, but were reduced to 

 mere geometrical spheres or circles, they were~not the 

 less products of the mind alone, something addi- 

 tional to the facts observed. The same is the case in 

 all other discoveries. The facts are known, but they 

 are insulated and unconnected, till the discoverer 

 supplies from his own store a principle of connexion. 

 The pearls are there, but they will not hang together 

 till some one provides the string/' 



That a conception of the mind is introduced is 

 indeed most certain, and Mr. Whewell has rightly 

 stated elsewhere, that to hit upon the right conception 

 is often a far more difficult, and more meritorious 

 achievement, than to prove its applicability when 

 obtained. But a conception implies, and corresponds 

 to, something conceived : and although the conception 



Phil Ind. Sciences, ii., 213, 214. 



