366 INDUCTION. 



primitives, envisagees comme lois rdelles du monde, a 

 soigneusement maintenu leur valeur positive et per- 

 manente, la propriete de representer commodement 

 les phenomenes quand il s'agit d'une premiere 

 ebauche. Nos ressources a cet egard sont mme 

 bien plus etendues, precisement a cause que nous ne 

 nous faisons aucune illusion sur la realite des hypo- 

 theses ; ce qui nous permet d'employer sans scrupule, 

 en chaque cas, celle que nous jugeons la plus avanta- 

 geuse*." 



Mr. Whewell's remark, therefore, is as just as it 

 is interesting. Successive expressions for the colli- 

 gation of observed facts, or, in other words, successive 

 descriptions of a phenomenon as a whole, which has 

 been observed only in parts, may, though conflicting, 

 be all correct as far as they go. But it would surely 

 be absurd to assert this of conflicting inductions. 



The philosophic study of facts may be undertaken 

 for three different purposes : the simple description of 

 the facts ; their explanation ; or their prediction : 

 meaning by prediction, the determination of the 

 conditions under which similar facts may be expected 

 again to occur. To the first of these three operations 

 the name of Induction does not properly belong : to 

 the other two it does. Now, Mr. Whewell's observa- 

 tion is true of the first alone. Considered as a mere 

 description, the circular theory of the heavenly 

 motions represents perfectly well their general fea- 

 tures ; and by adding epicycles without limit, those 

 motions, even as now known to us, might be 

 expressed with any degree of accuracy that might be 

 required. The only real advantage of the elliptical 

 theory, as a mere description, would be its simplicity, 



* COMTE, Cours de Philosophic Positive, vol. ii., p. 202. 



