368 INDUCTION. 



There is, however, between Colligation and Induc- 

 tion, a real correlation, which it is important to con- 

 ceive correctly. Colligation is not always induction ; 

 but induction is always colligation. The assertion 

 that the planets move in ellipses, was but a mode of 

 representing observed facts ; it was but a colligation; 

 while the assertion that they are drawn, or tend, 

 towards the sun, was the statement of a new fact, 

 inferred by induction. But the induction, once made, 

 accomplishes the purposes of colligation likewise. 

 It brings the same facts, which Kepler had connected 

 by his conception of an ellipse, under the additional 

 conception of bodies acted upon by a central force, 

 and serves therefore as a new bond of connexion for 

 those facts ; a new principle for their classification. 



Moreover, that general description, which is 

 improperly confounded with induction, is neverthe- 

 less a necessary preparation for induction ; no less 

 necessary than correct observation of the facts them- 

 selves. Without the previous colligation of detached 

 observations by means of one general conception, we 

 could never have obtained any basis for an induction, 

 except in the case of phenomena of very limited 

 compass. We should not be able to affirm any 

 predicates at all, of a subject incapable of being 

 observed otherwise than piecemeal : much less could 

 we extend those predicates by induction to other 

 similar subjects. Induction, therefore, always pre- 

 supposes, not only that the necessary observations are 

 made with the necessary accuracy, but also that the 

 results of these observations are, so far as practicable, 

 connected together by general descriptions, enabling 

 the mind to represent to itself as wholes whatever 

 phenomena are capable of being so represented. 



To suppose, however, that nothing more is 



