406 INDUCTION. 



us, by establishing the general axiom that all causes 

 are liable to be counteracted in their effects by one 

 another, to dispense with the consideration of negative 

 conditions entirely, and limit the notion of cause to 

 the assemblage of the positive conditions of the pheno- 

 menon : one negative condition invariably under- 

 stood, and the same in all instances (namely, the 

 absence of all counteracting causes) being sufficient, 

 along with the sum of the positive conditions, to make 

 up the whole set of circumstances upon which the 

 phenomenon is dependant. 



4. Among the positive conditions, as we have 

 seen that there are some to which, in common par- 

 lance, the term cause is more readily and frequently 

 awarded,, so there are others to which it is, in ordinary 

 circumstances, refused. In most cases of causation 

 a distinction is commonly drawn between something 

 which acts, and some other thing which is acted upon, 

 between an agent and a patient. Both of these, it 

 would be universally allowed, are conditions of the 

 phenomenon ; but it would be thought absurd to call 

 the latter the cause, that title being reserved for the 

 former. The distinction, however, vanishes on exami- 

 nation, or rather is found to be only verbal ; arising 

 from an incident of mere expression, namely, that the 

 object said to be acted upon, and which is considered 

 as the scene in which the effect takes place, is com- 

 monly included in the phrase by which the effect is 



violated by such cases as this; although, if all counteracting 

 agencies were of this description, there would be no purpose served 

 by employing the formula, since we should still have to enumerate 

 specially the negative conditions of each phenomenon, instead of 

 regarding them as implicitly contained in the positive laws of the 

 various other agencies in nature. 



