COMPOSITION OF CAUSES. 435 



does not become compounded with it, but the two 

 together generate an altogether new phenomenon. 

 Suppose that the application of a certain quantity of 

 heat to a body merely increases its bulk, that a double 

 quantity melts it, and a triple quantity decomposes 

 it : these three effects being heterogeneous, no ratio, 

 whether corresponding or not to that of the quantities 

 of heat applied, can be established between them. 

 Thus we see that the supposed axiom of the pro- 

 portionality of effects to their causes fails at the 

 precise point where the principle of the Composi- 

 tion of Causes also fails ; viz., where the concur- 

 rence of causes is such as to determine a change in 

 the properties of the body generally, and render it 

 subject to new laws, more or less dissimilar to those 

 to which it conformed in its previous state of exist- 

 ence. The recognition, therefore, of any such law of 

 proportionality, is superseded by the more compre- 

 hensive principle, in which as much of it as is true is 

 implicitly asserted. 



The general remarks on causation, which seemed 

 necessary as an introduction to the theory of the 

 inductive process, may here terminate. That process 

 is essentially an inquiry into cases of causation. All 

 the uniformities which exist in the succession of phe- 

 nomena, and most of those which prevail in their 

 coexistence, are either, as we have seen, themselves 

 laws of causation, or consequences resulting from, and 

 corollaries capable of being deduced from, such laws. 

 If we could determine what causes are correctly as- 

 signed to what effects, and what effects to what 

 causes, we should be virtually acquainted with the 

 whole course of nature. All those uniformities which 

 are mere results of causation, might then be explained 

 and accounted for ; and every individual fact or event 



2 F 2 



