CHANCE, AND ITS ELIMINATION. 57 



deficiency, it labours under a characteristic imperfec- 

 tion, tending to render uncertain even such conclu- 

 sions as it is in itself adapted to prove. This imper- 

 fection arises from Plurality of Causes. Although two 

 or more cases in which the phenomenon a has been 

 met with, may have no common antecedent except A, 

 this does not prove that there is any connexion 

 between a and A, since a may have many causes, and 

 may have been produced, in these different instances, 

 not by anything which the instances had in common, 

 but by some of those elements in them which were 

 different. We, nevertheless, observed, that in propor- 

 tion to the multiplication of instances pointing to A 

 as the antecedent, the characteristic uncertainty of 

 the method diminishes, and the existence of a law of 

 connexion between A and a more nearly approaches 

 to certainty. It is now to be determined, after what 

 amount of experience this certainty may be deemed to 

 be practically attained, and the connexion between 

 A and a may be received as an empirical law. 



This question may be otherwise stated in more 

 familiar terms: After how many and what sort of 

 instances may it be concluded, that an observed coin- 

 cidence between two phenomena is not the effect of 

 chance? 



It is of the utmost importance for understanding 

 the logic of induction, that we should form a distinct 

 conception of what is meant by chance, and how the 

 phenomena which common language ascribes to that 

 abstraction are really produced. 



2. Chance is usually spoken of in direct antithesis 

 to law; whatever (it is supposed) cannot be ascribed 

 to any law, is attributed to chance. It is, however, 

 certain, that whatever happens is the result of some 



