REMAINING LAWS OF NATURE. 155 



ence only to phenomena; to actual, or possible, states 

 of external or internal consciousness, in ourselves or 

 others. Feelings of sensitive beings, or possibilities 

 of having such feelings, are the only things the exist- 

 ence of which can be a subject of logical induction, 

 because the only things of which the existence in indi- 

 vidual cases can be a subject of experience. 



It is true that a thing is said by us to exist, even 

 when it is absent, and therefore is not and cannot be 

 perceived. But even then, its existence is to us only 

 another word for our conviction that we should per- 

 ceive it on a certain supposition ; if we were placed in 

 the needful circumstances of time and place, and 

 endowed with the needful perfection of organs. My 

 belief that the Emperor of China exists, is simply my 

 belief that if I were transported to the imperial palace 

 or some other locality in Pekin, I should see him. 

 My belief that Julius Csesar existed, is my belief that 

 I should have seen him if I had been present in the 

 field of Pharsalia, or in the senate-house at Rome. 

 When I believe that stars exist beyond the utmost 

 range of my vision, though assisted by the most 

 powerful telescopes yet invented, my belief, philo- 

 sophically expressed, is, that with still better tele- 

 scopes, if such existed, I could see them, or that they 

 may be perceived by beings less remote from them in 

 space, or whose capacities of perception are superior 

 to mine. 



The existence, therefore, of a phenomenon, is but 

 another word for its being perceived, or for the inferred 

 possibility of perceiving it. When the phenomenon 

 is within the range of present observation, by present 

 observation we assure ourselves of its existence ; when 

 it is beyond that range, and is therefore said to be 

 absent, we infer its existence from marks or evidences. 



