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CHAPTER XXV. 

 OF THE GROUNDS OF DISBELIEF. 



1. THE method of arriving at general truths, or 

 general propositions fit to be believed, and the nature 

 of the evidence on which they are grounded, have 

 been discussed, as far as space and the writer's facul- 

 ties permitted, in the twenty- four preceding chapters. 

 But the result of the examination of evidence is not 

 always belief, nor even suspension, of judgment ; it is 

 sometimes disbelief. The philosophy, therefore, of 

 induction and experimental inquiry is incomplete, 

 unless the grounds not only of belief, but of disbelief, 

 are treated of ; and to this topic we shall devote one, 

 and the final, chapter. 



By disbelief is not here to be understood the mere 

 absence of belief. The ground for abstaining from 

 belief is simply the absence or insufficiency of proof; 

 and in considering what is sufficient evidence to sup- 

 port any given conclusion, we have already by, impli- 

 cation, considered what evidence is not sufficient for 

 the same purpose. By disbelief is here meant, not 

 the state of mind in which we are ignorant, and form 

 no opinion upon a subject, but that in which we are 

 fully persuaded that some opinion is not true; inso- 

 much that if evidence, even of great strength, (whether 

 grounded on the testimony of others or on our own 

 apparent perceptions,) were produced in favour of 

 the opinion, we should believe that the witnesses 

 spoke falsely, or that they, or ourselves if we were 

 the direct percipients, were mistaken. 



That there are such cases, no one is likely to 



