GROUNDS OF DISBELIEF. 185 



number of approximate generalizations, but with 

 some other and better established law of nature. 

 This extreme case, of a conflict between two supposed 

 laws of nature, has probably never actually occurred 

 where^ in the process of investigating both the laws,, 

 the true canons of scientific induction had been kept 

 in view; but if it did occur, it must terminate in the 

 total rejection of one of the supposed laws. It would 

 prove that there must be a flaw in the logical process 

 by which either one or the other was established; and 

 if there be so, that supposed general truth is no truth 

 at all. We cannot admit a proposition as a law of 

 nature, and yet believe a fact in real contradiction 

 to it. We must disbelieve the alleged .fact, or 

 believe that we were mistaken in admitting the sup- 

 posed law. 



But in order that any alleged fact should be con- 

 tradictory to a law of causation, the allegation must 

 be, not simply that the cause existed without being 

 followed by the effect, for that would be no uncommon 

 occurrence; but that this happened in the absence of 

 any adequate counteracting cause. Now in the case 

 of an alleged miracle, the assertion is the exact oppo- 

 site of this. It is, that the effect was defeated, not in 

 the absence, but in consequence, of a counteracting 

 cause, namely, a direct interposition of an act of the 

 will of some being who has power over nature; and 

 in particular of a being, whose will having originally 

 endowed all the causes with the powers by which they 

 produce their effects, may well be supposed able to 

 counteract them. A miracle (as was justly remarked 

 by Brown*) is no contradiction to the law of cause 



* See the two very remarkablen otes (A) and (F), appended to 

 his Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect. 



