186 INDUCTION. 



and effect; it is a new effect, supposed to be produced 

 by the introduction of a new cause. Of the ade- 

 quacy of that cause, if it exist, there can be no doubt ; 

 and the only antecedent improbability which can be 

 ascribed to the miracle, is the improbability that any 

 such cause had existence in the case. 



All, therefore, which Hume has made out, and 

 this he must be considered to have made out, is, that 

 no evidence can be sufficient to prove a miracle to 

 any one who did not previously believe the existence 

 of a being or beings with supernatural power ; or who 

 believed himself to have full proof that the character 

 of the Being whom he recognises, is inconsistent with 

 his having seen fit to interfere on the occasion in 

 question. The truth of this (however fatal to a 

 school of theology which has recently been revived 

 in this country, and which has the weakness to rest all 

 the evidences of religion upon tradition and testimony) 

 may be, and is, admitted by all defenders of revelation 

 who have made much figure as such during the pre- 

 sent century. It is now acknowledged by neatly all 

 the ablest writers on the subject, that natural religion 

 is the necessary basis of revealed ; that the proofs of 

 Christianity pre-suppose the being and moral attri- 

 butes of God; and that it is the conformity of a reli- 

 gion to those attributes which determines whether 

 credence ought to be given to its external evidences; 

 that (as the proposition is sometimes expressed) the 

 doctrine must prove the miracles, not the miracles the 

 doctrine. It is hardly necessary to point out the 

 complete accordance of these views with the opinions 

 which (not to mention other testimonies) the New 

 Testament itself shows to have been generally preva- 

 lent in the apostolic age ; when it was believed indeed 

 that miracles were necessary as credentials, and that 



