OBSERVATION AND DESCRIPTION. 205 



propositions which we make use of, either in science or 

 in common life, relate mostly to the objects themselves. 

 In every act of what is called observation, there is at 

 least one inference, from the sensations to the pre- 

 sence of the object; from the marks or diagnostics to 

 the entire phenomenon. And hence, among other con- 

 sequences, follows the seeming paradox, that a general 

 proposition collected from particulars is often more 

 certainly true than any one of the particular proposi- 

 tions from which, by an act of induction, it was 

 inferred. For, each of those particular (or rather sin- 

 gular) propositions involved an inference, from the 

 impression on the senses to the fact which caused 

 that impression: and this inference may have been 

 erroneous in any one of the instances, but cannot well 

 have been erroneous in all of them, provided their 

 number was sufficient to eliminate chance. The con- 

 clusion, therefore, that is, the general proposition, may 

 deserve more complete reliance than it would be safe 

 to repose in any one of the inductive premisses. 



The logic of observation, then, consists solely in a 

 correct discrimination between that, in a result of 

 observation, which has really been perceived, and that 

 which is an inference from the perception. What- 

 ever portion is inference, is amenable to the rules of 

 induction already treated of, and requires no further 

 notice here: the question for us in this place is, when 

 all which is inference is taken away, what remains. 

 There remain, in the first place, the mind's own 

 feelings or states of consciousness, namely, its out- 

 ward feelings or sensations, and its inward feelings 

 its thoughts, emotions, and volitions. Whether any- 

 thing else remains, or all else is inference from this; 

 whether the mind is capable of directly perceiving or 

 apprehending anything except states of its own con- 



