ABSTRACTION. 219 



quence is no more than what may be produced by 

 any casual association. What really takes place, is, 

 I conceive, more philosophically expressed by the 

 common word Comparison, than by the phrases " to 

 connect" or "to superinduce/' For, as the general 

 conception is itself obtained by a comparison of par- 

 ticular phenomena, so, when obtained, the mode in 

 which we apply it to other phenomena is again by 

 comparison. We compare phenomena with each 

 other to get the conception, and we then compare 

 those and other phenomena with the conception. We 

 get the conception of an animal (for instance) by com- 

 paring different animals, and when we afterwards see a 

 creature resembling an animal, we compare it with 

 our general conception of an animal ; and if it agrees 

 with that general conception, we include it in the class. 

 The conception becomes the type of comparison. 



And we need only consider what comparison is, 

 to see that where the objects are more than two, and 

 still more when they are an indefinite number, a type 

 of some sort is an indispensable condition of the com- 

 parison. When we have to arrange and classify a 

 great number of objects according to their agreements 

 and differences, we do not make a confused attempt 

 to compare all with all. We know that two things 

 are as much as the human mind can attend to at a 

 time, and we therefore fix upon one of the objects, 

 either at hazard or because it offers in a peculiarly 

 striking manner some important character, and, taking 

 this as our standard, we compare with it one object 

 after another. If we find a second object which pre- 

 sents a remarkable agreement with the first, inducing 

 us to class them together, the question instantly 

 arises, in what circumstances do they agree ? and to 

 take notice of these circumstances is already a first 



