ABSTRACTION. 221 



itself, and that we find the right conception by a 

 tentative process, trying first one and then another 

 until we hit the mark. It has been seen that the 

 conception is not furnished by the mind until it has 

 been furnished to the mind; and that the facts which 

 supply it are sometimes extraneous facts, but more 

 often the very facts which we are attempting to 

 arrange by it. It is quite true, however, that in 

 endeavouring to arrange the facts, at whatever point 

 we begin, we never advance three steps without forming 

 a general conception, more or less distinct and pre- 

 cise; and that this general conception becomes the 

 clue which we instantly endeavour to trace through 

 the rest of the facts, or rather, becomes the standard 

 with which we thenceforth compare them. If we are 

 not satisfied with the agreements which we discover 

 among the phenomena by comparing them with this 

 type, or with some still more general conception 

 which by an additional stage of abstraction we can 

 form from the type: we change our course, and look 

 out for other agreements : we recommence the com- 

 parison from a different starting-point, and so gene- 

 rate a different set of general conceptions. This is 

 the tentative process which Mr. Whewell speaks of; 

 and this it is which suggested the theory that the con- 

 ception is supplied by the mind itself. The different 

 conceptions which the mind successively tries, it 

 either already possessed from its previous experience, 

 or they were supplied to it in the very first stage of 

 the corresponding act of comparison; and since, in 

 the subsequent part of the process, the conception 

 manifested itself as something compared with the 

 phenomena, not evolved from them, Mr. Whe well's 

 opinion, though I cannot help thinking it erroneous, 

 is not unnatural. 



