NAMING. 235 



is a very limited view of the function of general 

 names. Even if there were a name for every indi- 

 vidual object, we should require general names as 

 much as we now do. Without them we could not 

 express the result of a single comparison, nor record 

 any one of the uniformities existing in nature; and 

 should be hardly better off in respect to Induction 

 than if we had no names at all. With none but 

 names of individuals (or, in other words, proper 

 names), we might by pronouncing the name, suggest 

 the idea of the object, but we could not assert a single 

 proposition; except the unmeaning ones formed by 

 predicating two proper names one of another. It is 

 only by means of general names that we can convey 

 any information, predicate any attribute, even of an 

 individual, much more of a class. Rigorously speak- 

 ing we could get on without any other general names 

 than the abstract names of attributes; all our propo- 

 sitions might be of the form " such an individual 

 object possesses such an attribute," or "such an attri- 

 bute is always (or never) conjoined with such another 

 attribute." In fact, however, mankind have always 

 given general names to objects as well as attributes, 

 and indeed before attributes: but the general names 

 given to objects imply attributes, derive their whole 

 meaning from attributes; and are chiefly useful as the 

 language by means of which we predicate the attri- 

 butes which they connote. 



It remains to be considered what principles are to 

 be adhered to in giving general names, so that these 

 names, and the general propositions in which they 

 fill a place, may conduce most to the purposes of 

 Induction. 



